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Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards Reinstating Dangerous Employees
Jeffrey Alan Goldenbergt
Imagine a nuclear power plant situated near an urban center.
In the event of a nuclear accident, a radiation leak could increase
the risk of cancer to the city's inhabitants a hundred-fold. Suppose
further that the engineer supervising radiation containment has
been found drunk at the control panel. The engineer is immedi-
ately discharged by the utility company. Pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, the engineer's union brings a grievance con-
cerning the firing to arbitration. After hearing testimony from fel-
low employees that the engineer has had a drinking problem for
several years, the arbitrator, having been assured by the engineer
that he is truly sorry and will never drink again, decides that dis-
charge is too severe a sanction and orders the utility company to
reinstate the engineer. Under current standards of judicial defer-
ence to labor arbitration awards, no court would be able review
this arbitrator's questionable judgment.
Arbitrators make crucial reinstatement decisions in several
modern industries that, by the nature of their operations, pose a
risk to the health and safety of the general public. Companies en-
gaged in the energy, transportation and health industries, for ex-
ample, have a responsibility to minimize this risk through careful
monitoring of employees who work in potentially hazard-creating
jobs. When such an employee's actions are either reckless or im-
paired by substance abuse, and consequently endanger the public,
it is sensible for a company to discharge that employee to protect
the public, deter similar acts and minimize exposure to tort liabil-
ity. It is not certain, however, that the discharge of a potentially
dangerous employee will be upheld in grievance arbitration.
Some arbitrators see discharge as an extreme sanction and
tend to avoid this penalty where possible. For example, if an arbi-
trator feels that a reckless employee may be deterred from future
dangerous activity by a lesser sanction, he or she may, after taking
into account the time it took to process the grievance through arbi-
t A.B. 1975, University of California; J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Chicago.
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tration, order reinstatement after a short suspension. Similarly, an
arbitrator may order reinstatement of a substance-abusing em-
ployee who has undergone some degree of rehabilitation. Under
current law, an arbitrator's decision to reinstate a once-dangerous
employee is final and binding unless it can be shown that the
award directly contravenes public policy.1
Some federal courts have declined to enforce arbitrators' deci-
sions reinstating employees discharged for endangering the public.
These courts have held that any reinstatement of an employee who
has seriously placed the public at risk violates public policy. Such
a conclusion may be questionable if the arbitrator has correctly de-'
termined that a specific sanction or rehabilitation program will
successfully prevent the employee from dangerous acts in the fu-
ture; in such a case, reinstatement could not possibly violate public
policy. On the other hand, if the arbitrator's opinion is erroneously
based on insufficient information about whether the specific sanc-
tion or rehabilitation program will ensure that the employee will
act responsibly and safely in the future, then returning that em-
ployee to his or her former job may actually increase the danger to
public health and safety.
For a court to ascertain accurately whether a specific award
violates public policy, it must evaluate the specific grounds upon
which the arbitrator based the reinstatement decision. Unfortu-
nately, consonant with the long-standing policy of strict deference
to labor arbitration awards, an arbitrator need not deliver an opin-
ion or support an award with evidence or defined reasoning.' As a
consequence, courts have no method for distinguishing awards that
endanger the public from those that do not, and must defer to the
arbitrator's discretion.
While strict deference to an arbitrator's decisions relating to
industrial matters is generally appropriate since arbitrators are
presumably chosen for their expertise in a specific industry, it is
uncertain whether this expertise necessarily extends to decisions
about effective punishments or rehabilitation programs. When the
health and safety of the public is at issue, it is inappropriate for a
court to blindly enforce an unsupported award.
This Comment argues that although strict deference to labor
arbitration awards is appropriate for problems arising in the indus-
trial context, when substantial public health and safety interests
are at stake, deference should not be given unless the record
See text accompanying notes 19-45.
See text accompanying notes 12-14.
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clearly supports the arbitrator's determination that reinstatement
will not endanger public safety. A reinstatement award based
solely upon an arbitrator's good faith belief that the employee will
act responsibly in the future is an insufficient protection for the
public. Additionally, in instances of on-the-job substance abuse, an
arbitrator's award should provide a mechanism for monitoring the
employee's rehabilitation.
Part I of this Comment reviews the rationales underlying the
thirty-year-old doctrine of judicial deference to labor arbitration.
Part II discusses the public policy exception to the general rule of
deference. Part III examines three recent cases in which the fed-
eral courts have disagreed over whether arbitral reinstatement of
employees discharged for endangering the public contravenes pub-
lic policy. Part IV argues that the rule of strict deference should be
modified in cases where an employee's misconduct has placed the
public in a significant degree of danger.
I. RATIONALES FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ARBITRATION
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court indicated its agree-
ment with Congress's preference for labor arbitration' in the Steel-
workers Trilogy.4 In essence, the Trilogy holds that when a collec-
tive bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause, every
claim covered by that clause must be arbitrated, whether or not a
court might believe the claim to be frivolous. All grievances not
specifically excluded from the scope of an arbitration clause are
See Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") § 203(d), 29 USC § 173(d) (1982)
("Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.").
The Steelworkers Trilogy is the popular name for three opinions on labor arbitration
written by Justice Douglas and handed down on June 20, 1960: United Steelworkers v
American Mfg. Co., 363 US 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 US 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US
593 (1960). The Court recently and unequivocally reaffirmed its adherence to the Trilogy:
The principles necessary to decide this case are not new. They were set out by this
Court over 25 years.ago in a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.
These precepts have served the industrial relations community well, and have led
to continued reliance on arbitration, rather than strikes or lockouts, as the pre-
ferred method of resolving disputes arising during the term of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement. We see no reason either to question their continuing validity,
or to eviscerate their meaning by creating an exception to their general
applicability.
AT&T Technologies v Communications Workers, 475 US 643, 648 (1986).
American Mfg., 363 US at 568-69.
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presumed to be covered.' So long as the award is based on the con-
tract, it is final, binding, and may not be reviewed by any court
unless contrary to external law.' Judicial deference is appropriate
because the parties bargained for an arbitrator to interpret the col-
lective bargaining agreement.8 Consequently, an arbitration award
is seen either as a part of the contract or as a binding interpreta-
tion of it.
Because maximum industrial efficiency depends not only on a
fair interpretation of the contract, but also on an interpretation
founded in the specific needs of the industry, the best interpreter
is an arbitrator with expertise in a particular field of business. The
Trilogy, in perhaps a somewhat romanticized view, envisions an ar-
bitrator who is an expert, well versed in the "industrial common
law-the practices of the industry and the shop."9 A court, on the
other hand, is less competent to make the type of business judg-
ments required to maximize productivity:
The parties expect that [an arbitrator's] judgment of a
particular grievance will reflect not only what the con-
tract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agree-
ment permits, such factors as the effect upon productiv-
ity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of
the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be height-
ened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using
the arbitration process is primarily to further their com-
mon goal of uninterrupted production under the agree-
ment, to make the agreement serve their specialized
needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the deter-
mination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed.10
An arbitrator's superior competence is not guaranteed merely be-
cause she is selected by parties, who have a stake in the outcome
and are best situated to evaluate her credentials. However, it is
reasonable for a court to assume that the chosen arbitrator will be
the best available under the circumstances. A private arbitrator
may have .access to information about all aspects of the industry.
6 Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 584-85.
Enterprise Wheel, 363 US at 599.
' Id.
Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 581-82.
'0 Id at 582.
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Unlike a court's, an arbitrator's inquiry is not restricted to the
facts of a particular dispute, and the decision may incorporate, tan-
gential industrial knowledge.
Arbitration may also promote industrial peace. An arbitration
clause is commonly bargained for in exchange for a no-strike
clause. Because labor makes a promise to refrain from wildcat
strikes so long as grievances are taken to arbitration, any interven-
tion by a court into this process might cause an increase in strikes
and work stoppages. For this reason, combining an arbitration
clause with a no-strike clause is an effective way of achieving feder-
ally-mandated industrial stabilization. 1 Since a strike may stop
production, the industrial peace rationale mirrors the arbitral com-
petency rationale: both focus on increased productivity through an
inexpensive and relatively swift process for resolution of labor
disputes.
In sum, the benefits of enhanced productivity, industrial sta-
bility and adjudicatory efficiency require strict deference by courts
to arbitration awards. Courts must refuse to review the merits of
an award.' 2 According to the Trilogy, this is true even when the
arbitral opinion is ambiguous or does not explain the reasons for
the award.' 3 Justice Douglas reasoned in Enterprise Wheel, one of
the Trilogy cases, that to require clear opinions would cause arbi-
trators to "play it safe by writing no supporting opinions."' 4
A principled limit on the scope of labor arbitration is that an
award is "legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement."' 5 An arbitrator "does not sit to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice."' An arbitrator can-
not use specialized knowledge to fashion awards that are not
grounded in the specific provisions of the collective bargaining
" Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 578 n 4 (citing Textile Workers Union v Lincoln Mills,
353 US 448, 455 (1957)).
12 Enterprise Wheel, 363 US at 596.
" Id at 598.
" Id. Perhaps Justice Douglas did not envision a case where an arbitrator's award was
not limited to the industrial arena and could significantly impact on public welfare. This
Comment agrees that the practice of not requiring a clear, unambiguous award is appropri-
ate where an arbitrator has industrial expertise, but argues that where an arbitrator is not
an expert and an award will potentially impair public health and safety, it would not be
unreasonable for a court to require that the award be grounded in fact. If an arbitrator has
no special expertise in drug rehabilitation, for example, it would be appropriate to bring in
an expert on rehabilitation programs who could accurately assess the probability of recidi-
vism. Only after such an assessment could an arbitrator, and subsequently a court, know the
degree of risk that a reinstated employee could pose to the public.
Id at 597.
16 Id.
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agreement. This limitation is, however, open-ended. Many explicit
contractual provisions, such as one allowing discharge only for
"just cause," are inherently ambiguous. Since an issue is presumed
to be arbitrable unless specifically excluded from the contract,"
there will be many issues decided by an arbitrator that have no
foundation in the text of the contract. As a result, some reviewing
courts have exercised broad discretion in determining whether an
arbitrator has gone beyond the implied contractual boundaries.
Criticizing cases where courts have found contractual grounds to
overturn an arbitration award, Judge Reinhardt argues that the
only time courts invoke the "essence from the collective bargaining
agreement" language is when they want to "dispense their own
brand of industrial justice."'
In practice, relatively few courts overturn awards as being
outside the bounds of the contract. For three decades, the policy of
strict deference to labor awards has allowed arbitrators wide dis-
cretion in adjudicating labor grievances. Only public policy con-
cerns and standard contractual principles have operated as a check
on arbitral power.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in W.R. Grace & Co. v Local
759,19 acknowledged that an arbitration award might be denied en-
forcement if it violated public policy. Because of the inherent am-
biguity of the term "public policy," this exception to the general
rule of strict deference has been the subject of continuing contro-
versy.20 It has been on public policy grounds that employers seek-
ing to uphold discharges of public-endangering employees have ar-
gued that reinstatement is improper. It is important, therefore, to
examine the development of the public policy exception, first de-
fined in Grace and amplified in United Paperworkers Interna-
" AT&T, 475 US at 650 (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 582-83).
" Stephen R. Reinhardt, Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 40 Natl
Acad Arb Ann Mtg 25, 33 (BNA 1987).
'9 461 US 757 (1983).
20 See Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash
Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 Chi Kent L Rev 3
(1988); Comment, Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Sav-
ing Grace in the Search for a Well-Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U Miami L Rev 767
(1988).
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tional Union v Misco, Inc.,21 before turning to more recent public
safety discharge cases implicating this standard.22
In Grace, an employer had signed a conciliation agreement
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
to avoid Title VII liability for discrimination in the hiring of blacks
and women. The company argued that a subsequent arbitration
award ordering damages to laid-off white males violated public
policy. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding the
company liable for its obligations under the pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement in spite of a judicial order enforcing the
EEOC conciliation agreement. The Court held that since an award
of damages rather than specific performance did not require violat-
ing the judicial order, it did not violate the public policy against
violating judicial orders.2 3 The Court did not allow the company to
shift the loss to the employees, especially since the company did
not involve the union in the conciliation process.2 '
In the course of its opinion, the Court stated it would deny
enforcement of an arbitration award that directly contravened
public policy:
As with any contract, however, .a court may not enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public
policy.... [T]he question of public policy is ultimately
one for resolution by the courts .... Such a public policy,
however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal prece-
dents and not from general considerations of supposed
public interests."25
Even though W.R. Grace's public policy argument failed, the Court
left the door open. Subsequently, companies invoked Grace in sup-
port of arguments that arbitral reinstatements of discharged em-
ployees violated various public policies.26 Lower courts split in
" 484 US 29 (1987).
" See part III.
23 Grace, 461 US at 769. Note that in Misco the Court stated that two public policies
were involved in Grace: "[1] obedience to judicial orders and [2] voluntary compliance with
Title VII." Misco, 484 US at 43.
24 Id at 770.
" Id at 766 (quoting Muschany v United States, 324 US 49, 65-66 (1945)) (citations
omitted).
2 See, for example, United States Postal Service v American Postal Workers Union,
736 F2d 822, 824 (1st Cir 1984) (public policy against embezzlement of government funds);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v Great Western Food Co., 712 F2d 122, 125 (5th Cir 1983)
(public policy against drunk driving by truckers while on duty).
6251 631
632 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
their interpretation of what constituted a proper public policy.
Some judges adopted a broad view and suggested, for example,
that a public policy against embezzlement of postal funds was suf-
ficient.17 Others argued, adopting what Professor Meltzer has
called the "limitist" view,28 that an award need violate "positive
law" in order to come under the exception.2 9
In an effort to clarify the public policy exception, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Misco. There, an arbitrator reinstated
the operator of a hazardous machine who had been discharged for
allegedly possessing marijuana on company property. The arbitra-
tor refused to consider evidence that had come to light after the
company had discharged the employee. In challenging the award,
the company argued that reinstatement was contrary to public pol-
icy. This argument prevailed in the district court, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, ruling that the relevant public policy was one
against "operation of dangerous machinery under the influence of
drugs or alcohol." 30
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that an arbitrator's
finding of fact and determination of remedies should stand unless
tainted, by fraud or dishonesty. 1 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice White stated that "as long as the arbitrator is even argua-
bly construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope
of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision. '32 The Court rea-
soned that protection of "speedy resolution of grievances by pri-
vate mechanisms" requires the strictest deference.33 Even if the
factfinding of an arbitrator is patently "silly," such facts are not to
be reviewed by a court.3 4 Unless the parties limit the arbitrator's
discretion by contract, it is properly within his or her discretion to
reject or modify a sanction imposed by management. 8 Should an
arbitrator misread a contract and, as a consequence, improperly
modify a company sanction, a court's proper role is not to vacate
the award but to remand the case to the arbitrator for a definitive
27 See American Postal Workers, 736 F2d at 826.
28 See Bernard D. Meltzer, After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy De-
fense, 10 Ind Rel Law J 241, 242 (1988).
11 See, for example, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v Grasselli Employees Indepen-
dent Ass'n, 790 F2d 611, 620 (7th Cir 1986) (Easterbrook concurring).
20 Misco, 484 US at 35.
2 1 Id at 38.
22 Id (emphasis added).
33 Id.
4 Id at 39.
" Id at 41 (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 US at 597).
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construction of the contract. s6 Thus, under Misco, it is clear that
the determination of both facts and remedies are to be left to the
arbitrator.
Addressing Misco's public policy argument, the Court reaf-
firmed Grace, holding that common law principles prevent a court
from enforcing any contract violating law or public policy.3 7 This
doctrine is "justified by the observation that the -public's interests
in confining the scope of private agreements to which it is not a
party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account of
those interests when it considers whether to enforce such agree-
ments."' Thus, one key element in determining whether a con-
tract has violated a public policy is finding a public interest that
must be protected. A second required element is whether a policy
protecting this interest can be found in either positive law or legal
precedent. 9 It should be noted that a court's function is not
merely to declare whether an arbitrator's award is proper; if it
finds no fraud, self-dealing or manifest disregard for the contract,
it must enforce an award unless it would be contrary to a clearly
defined public policy. Although the Court in both Grace and Misco
was silent on the question of precisely where a court should find
sufficient legal precedents, it clearly stated that a court cannot look
to "general considerations of supposed public interests." '40
Once a distinct public policy is found, the reviewing court
must decide whether the award explicitly conflicts with the rele-
vant public policy.!' The award must be examined to see whether
enforcement of the award would actually, not speculatively, violate
that policy.42 Misco also emphasizes that an arbitrator may disa-
gree with a company's sanction for employee misconduct and that
the judgment of the arbitrator is especially important in formulat-
ing remedies. 3
By requiring that an award explicitly conflict with public pol-
icy before it is overturned, Misco prevents a court from substitut-
ing its judgment even when it believes that a particular sanction
may be insufficient to ensure that the past objectionable conduct
Misco, 484 US at 42.
37 Id at 42.
38 Id.
" Grace, 461 US at 766.
40 Id.
Misco, 484 US at 43.
' Id at 44 ("A refusal to enforce an award must rest on more than speculation or
assumption.").
43 Id at 41.
625]
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of .an employee will not be repeated. Under Misco, for example, a
court is not able to overrule an arbitrator's determination that the
grievance arbitration process will reform an employee who has
acted contrary to public policy. This determination might even be
implied, because under the Trilogy an arbitrator is not required to
write a clear opinion." If discharge is predicated on a violation of
public policy, then any arbitral reinstatement may be presumed to
include a sanction based on a finding of the employee's amenabil-
ity to discipline; under Misco, this implied finding is an unreview-
able determination of fact.4
It is this extreme degree of deference to reinstatement that is
at the heart of the public safety dilemma. When an employee's act
substantially endangers the public, it should not be difficult for a
court to find a well-defined and dominant public policy against
such an act. The rationale of the public policy exception, as stated
in Misco," is that courts best protect public interests that conflict
with a private agreement.'6 Yet when it is conceivable that an em-
ployee will be deterred from future dangerous acts, an arbitrator,
acting under few legal restraints, is given almost unlimited power
to decide how the public will be protected.
III. PUBLIC SAFETY APPLICATIONS OF THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Some courts have overturned arbitral awards, imposing minor,
if any, sanctions on employees who have substantially endangered
the public. Plainly, the intention of these courts has been to pro-
tect the public. This intention is consistent with the spirit of the
public policy exception, but seems to conflict with the Supreme
Court's insistence that remedial discretion be left in the hands of
an arbitrator.
Courts applying Misco have viewed the public policy exception
in two ways, neither of which is completely satisfactory. The first
view, a broad interpretation of Misco, looks to the employee's con-
duct that led to the discharge: if that conduct violated public pol-
" See text accompanying notes 12-14.
" See Misco, 484 US at 44-45:
To conclude from the fact that marijuana had been found in Cooper's car that
Cooper had ever been or would be under the influence of marijuana while he was
on the job and operating dangerous machinery is an exercise in factfinding about
Cooper's use of drugs and his amenability to discipline, a task that exceeds the
authority of a court asked to overturn an arbitration award.
(Emphasis added.)
46 Id at 42.
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icy, then the resolution of the grievance should be left to the judi-
ciary. Although producing desirable results where public safety is
at issue, the broad view misapplies Misco because it gives little or
no weight to the requirement of strict deference to arbitral reme-
dies. The broad view also places undue emphasis on the original
safety violation rather than on the public policy implications of the
reinstatement decision. According to the other view, a narrow in-
terpretation of Misco, an award must on its face violate positive
law or a well-defined public policy for it to be overturned. The
problem with the narrow view is that it requires a court to enforce
an arbitration award even when there is a significant possibility
that the reinstated employee will continue to pose a threat to pub-
lic health and safety.
A. The Broad View
In a case involving the containment of radiation in a nuclear
power plant, Iowa Electric Light & Power v Local Union 204,47 the
Eighth Circuit ignored an arbitral finding and affirmed a district
court ruling overturning the reinstatement of a machinist who had
violated a plant safety rule. The reactor building, in which the ma-
chinist worked, required pressurization to prevent leakage of radia-
tion; the pressure was maintained by interlock doors, designed to
be opened one at a time. Partially immobilized by a leg cast, the
machinist preferred to get to lunch before the noon crowd. One
day, shortly before noon, he found the door leading out of the -pres-
surized area locked shut. When he learned the door was locked be-
cause another door on the network was blocked by a truck, he re-
quested permission from the control room engineer to defeat the
interlock system. His request was denied. Not one to give up eas-
ily, he asked the foreman outside the door to pull the interlock
fuse. The foreman complied and the machinist made it to an early
lunch; his unorthodox method for doing so, however, cost him his
job.48
The electric company fired the machinist for "violating sec-
ondary containment."' The discharge was subsequently approved
in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") report. The union
filed a grievance and, pursuant to the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the issue of "just cause" for the discharge was brought
47 834 F2d 1424 (8th Cir 1987).
" Id at 1425-26.
" Id at 1426. Secondary containment is a buffer zone around the perimeter of the pri-
mary area located at the core of the reactor.
625]
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before an arbitrator. The arbitrator found that summary discharge
was "too severe" a penalty under the circumstances and ordered
the company to reinstate the machinist, even though the arbitrator
also found the employee's actions "deliberate, improper, foolish
and thoughtless."50 According to the arbitrator, mitigating circum-
stances existed: the machinist was not aware that defeating the in-
terlock doors was as serious a matter as the company claimed. In-
consistently, the arbitrator also noted that the purpose of the
interlock system was "well known" and that the "grievant was
fully aware he was not to disable the door."51 The absurdity of
finding the machinist unaware of the gravity of his act was ampli-
fied by the fact that he had attended and passed several courses
that discussed the importance of radiation containment.2
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that enforce-
ment of the award reinstating the machinist would violate the
"public policy of this nation concerning strict compliance with
safety regulations at nuclear facilities. ' 53 To illustrate the well-de-
fined and dominant nature of this public policy the court referred
first to NRC safety rules and then to Supreme Court dicta con-
cerning the public's interest in the safe operation of nuclear
plants. 4
The court held that the machinist was "no longer to be trusted
to work in such a critical environment when he shows no respect
for the safety implications of his actions and when he is Willing to
jeopardize the safety of the public." 5 The court went on to
explain:
Our holding today should not be read as a blanket justifi-
cation for the discharge of every employee who breaches
a public safety regulation at a nuclear power plant. There
may be circumstances under which a violation might be
excused. But in this case, [the machinist's] violation of
the safety rule was serious. 6
Thus the gravity of the violation of the rule requiring containment
was dispositive.
50 Iowa Electric, 834 F2d at 1424.
" Id.
52 Id at 1429.
" Id at 1426.
14 Id at 1428.
"' Id at 1429 (citing Iowa Electric Light and Power v Local Union 204, Nos C85-0135
and C85-0137, slip op at 18 (ND Iowa, March 11, 1987)).
" Id (footnote omitted).
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While this may seem a sensible outcome in light of public
safety, it ignores the arbitrator's substantive determination that
just cause required that the employee have knowledge of the seri-
ousness of the rule."7 Iowa Electric could certainly have specified in
its contract with the employees that a single violation of an NRC
safety standard would constitute just cause for discharge, regard-
less of the employee's knowledge of the seriousness of that stan-
dard. One must ask, however, why the arbitrator did not consider
the machinist's lack of knowledge as an indication of the danger he
posed to the community.
Another example of a lower court taking an overly broad view
of Misco occurred in 1988. Thb Eleventh Circuit, relying in part on
Iowa Electric, upheld a district court's decision overturning the re-
instatement of an airline pilot who flew while intoxicated. In Delta
Air Lines v Air Line Pilots Association,5" the pilot of a passenger
airliner spent a scheduled layover in Bangor, Maine with other
crew members and flight attendants. During the course of the eve-
ning, the pilot allegedly consumed three beers, shared three carafes
of wine, drank a "nightcap," accepted a stranger's offer to buy him
drink, and then, after "blacking out" at 10:00 p.m., switched to
scotch, which he drank until he retired at 12:30 a.m. He arrived at
the aircraft the next morning with a red face, glassy eyes and alco-
hol on his breath. The flight attendants voiced concerns about his
ability to fly the plane, but the crew protected him and he flew the
entire trip to Boston. After the plane landed, the flight attendants
reported the pilot to Delta's chief pilot. The pilot's intoxication
had been so obvious that it also caused a passenger to make a re-
port to the airline's customer service department. The chief pilot
subsequently ordered the entire flight crew to take blood alcohol
tests, which showed that only the pilot had been legally intoxicated
11 In a similar vein, the arbitrator in Misco found there was not just cause when the
company discharged an employee prior to having conclusive evidence of his possession of
marijuana on company premises. Evidence that surfaced after the date of discharge was
held by the arbitrator to be an insufficient basis for discharge. Misco, 484 US at 35. The
Court observed that "[t]he parties bargained for arbitration to settle disputes and were free
to set the procedural rules for arbitrators to follow if they chose." Id at 39. Even though
Misco dealt with a procedural issue while Iowa Electric was concerned with a substantive
issue, the respective standards of evidence and knowledge used by the arbitrators are re-
flected in common law. Since neither collective bargaining agreement specified different
standards, neither arbitrator can rightly be accused of having detoured from authority
under the contract.
68 861 F2d 665 (11th Cir 1988).
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at the time of the flight. Five days later, the airline discharged the
pilot.59
After its grievance was denied, the union submitted the dis-
pute before a five-member arbitration board. The board found that
there was not just cause for the discharge. The board reasoned that
since on prior occasions intoxicated employees had been offered an
opportunity to enter a rehabilitation program, Delta should have
offered a similar program in this instance. The board noted that
after the pilot had been discharged, he was diagnosed as an alco-
holic, and had entered a rehabilitation program on his own accord.
Since the board found this rehabilitation sufficient, it ordered rein-
statement without back pay. In addition, the company was ordered
to pay for the cost of the alcohol treatment program.60 The district
court set aside the award as violating a public policy "against al-
lowing pilots of airliners to operate aircraft while under the influ-
ence of alcohol." 6' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 2
Proving a well-defined public policy against intoxicated pilots
was a rather simple matter. The court cited forty state statutes
prohibiting flying while intoxicated, including those of the origin
and destination states of the Delta flight. The court also observed
that federal regulations prohibit flying while intoxicated. 3
What the court did not find was a well-defined public policy
against hiring formerly intoxicated pilots. But the court reasoned
that public policy was not only violated by flying drunk, but by the
reinstatement of any pilot discharged for doing so:
[w]here the person performs his employment duties and,
in doing so, violates standards, restraints and restrictions
on conduct, clearly and explicitly established by the peo-
ple in their laws, a requirement that the employer suffer
that malperformance and not discharge the offender does
itself violate the same well established public policy. 4
The problem here is that the court formulated its own second de-
gree public policy. Under the court's analysis, an award violates
public policy if it does not allow an employer to fire an employee
who violates public policy. The actual policy that was violated by
8 Delta Air Lines, 861 F2d at 666-67.
60 Id at 668.
" Id at 669 (quoting Delta Air Lines v Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 686 F Supp 1573 (ND Ga
1987)).
02 Id at 675.
e Delta Air Lines, 861 F2d at 672-73.
04 Id at 674 (emphasis in original).
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the award was thus not one against flying drunk, but rather one
against keeping an airline from discharging a pilot who did so. If
this is indeed the relevant policy, then under Misco it must be
"well defined and dominant." Without finding further support, the
court simply assumed the amorphous policy against overturning
discharges was part of the well-defined policy against flying drunk.
.Note that the arbitration board found that the pilot had been
effectively rehabilitated." Would the board violate public policy by
rehiring a sober pilot? The court recognized this inconsistency and
attempted to resolve it by adding a qualification:
There is no public policy against rehiring former al-
coholics, post-rehabilitation. However, the arbitrator in
this case was not authorized to decide whether, having
been rehabilitated, [the pilot] should be rehired. The ar-
bitrator's decision in this case was limited to whether
Delta had just cause to discharge [the pilot], after he had
flown an airplane while drunk, and before he had given
the airline any indication that he was an alcoholic. 6
Barring an arbitrator from making a decision about rehabilita-
tion is contrary to Misco, which requires deference to an arbitra-
tor's finding of remedies and amenability to discipline. Such a
limitation of an arbitrator's power to provide remedies would re-
sult in an absurd situation: if an arbitrator were to decide there is
no just cause for discharge, he or she would be prohibited from
reinstating an employee. Such a rule would be contrary not only to
Misco but to the Trilogy as well.
Both Delta Air Lines and Iowa Electric seem to hold that it is
the employee's act, not the arbitration award, that triggers the
public policy exception. This broad view of Misco evades the re-
quirement that an award itself violate public policy before it is re-
viewable. Both cases focus on the original safety violation. Conse-
quently, both decisions, regardless of how satisfying their
conclusions may be, are misapplications of Misco.
B. The Narrow View
A more strict application of Misco and the Trilogy can also
produce undesirable results. In Stead Motors v Automotive Ma-
" Delta Air Lines, 861 F2d at 668.
66 Id.
'7 Misco, 484 US at 44-45.
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chinists ("Stead Motors II"),68 the Ninth Circuit upheld the rein-
statement, after a four-month suspension, of an automobile
mechanic who had been discharged for negligently failing to
tighten wheel lug nuts. In Stead Motors 1,69 the first panel to hear
the case followed Iowa Electric and defined the relevant public
policy as a concern for safety on state roads.7 0 The panel supported
its opinion by looking to a California statute proscribing operating
a vehicle in an unsafe condition71 and by noting that the legislature
had established the California Bureau of Automotive Repair 72 to
regulate the automobile repair industry. Under Bureau regulations
a dealer may lose its registration if an employee is guilty of gross
negligence.7 8 The panel affirmed the district court's ruling that had
vacated the mechanic's reinstatement and back pay award on the
ground that it violated public policy.7'
On rehearing en banc, the court held that since the arbitrator
did not violate public policy by reinstating the careless mechanic
after a 120-day suspension, the award was consistent with the bar-
gain of the parties to have an arbitrator evaluate "just cause. '75
Judge Reinhardt, writing for the plurality, emphasized that a court
is, with few exceptions, bound to enforce an arbitration award,
even when the court believes the award states facts and law erro-
neously.76 He observed that this degree of deference is "unique"
and "unparalleled," but explained that arbitration serves along
with a collective bargaining agreement to maintain "equity and a
balance of power in the workplace. 7 7 Even judges with the best of
intentions must refrain from exceeding their "permissible scope of
review. '7 18 A labor contract is merely a framework, and decisions of
an arbitrator are designed to "fill in the gaps. ' '79 Such arbitration
awards are part of the contract itself and must be enforced unless
6 886 F2d 1200 (9th Cir 1989).
6 843 F2d 357 (9th Cir 1988) ("Stead Motors I"), reh'g granted, Stead Motors v Auto-
motive Machinists, 857 F2d 682 (9th Cir 1988) (en banc), opinion withdrawn, different re-
sults reached on reh'g, Stead Motors v Automotive Machinists, 886 F2d 1200 (9th Cir 1989)
(en banc).
7" Id at 358-59.
" Id at 359 (citing California Vehicle Code § 24002).
7 Id at 359 (citing California Automotive Repair Act, Calif Bus and Prof Code § 9882).
71 Id (citing Calif Bus and Prof Code § 9884.7).
71 Id at 358-59.
11 Stead Motors 11, 886 F2d at 1217.
76 Id at 1204.
Id at 1205.
78 Stead Motors 11, 886 F2d at 1204.
78 Id at 1205.
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voidable under law.80 Consequently, "[j]udicial 'reinterpretation,'
no less than judicial reformation of a contract against the wishes of
all the parties to it, is ordinarily an invalid exercise of ... power." 81
The court recognized that arbitrators are generally not lawyers
and are neither bound by precedent nor subject to reversal for fac-
tual or legal errors. They are "chosen for knowledge of the indus-
trial 'shop' rather than any general knowledge of the law."'8 2 Pro-
ceedings are informal, and lack rules of procedure and evidence.
Consequently, arbitration awards should not be expected to pro-
vide explicit detail for either findings of fact or rulings.8 3 Presuma-
bly, if parties want the protection of procedural and evidential
safeguards, they must bargain for them.
The court was critical of broad applications of the public pol-
icy exception because it provided lower courts with a tool for re-
versing awards they found objectionable. Public policy, under the
rubric of Grace, had become "a favorite pretext for those less than
favorably disposed to the awards of labor arbitrators." 4 The court
adopted the narrow view, reading Misco to clarify Grace on this
point.85 Central to the court's holding was their formulation of a
threshold question for applying the public policy exception: is
there a well defined public policy barring reinstatement? This in-
quiry, the court asserted, is often neglected: 6
Simply put, a public policy in favor of or against what?
In our view, only one answer comports with Misco, and
with our narrow rule. If a court relies on public policy to
vacate an arbitral award reinstating an employee, it must
be a policy that bars reinstatement. Courts cannot deter-
mine merely that there is a "public policy" against a par-
ticular sort of behavior in society generally and, irrespec-
tive of the finding of the arbitrator, conclude that
reinstatement of an individual who engaged in that sort
of conduct in the past would violate that policy. In our
view, a faithful reading of Misco requires something
more. A court must both delineate an overriding public
policy rooted in something more than "general considera-
10 Stead Motors H, 886 F2d at 1205-06.
"' Id at 1206.
82 Id.
83 Id (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 US at 598).
, Stead Motors II, 886 F2d at 1210 (emphasis added).
" Id at 1211.
8 Id at 1212.
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tions of supposed public interests," and, of equal signifi-
cance, it must demonstrate that the policy is one that
specifically militates against the relief ordered by the
arbitrator.8 7
By choosing a narrow construction, the court refused to follow
the "hard" cases of Iowa Electric or Delta Air Lines, which it dis-
tinguished because of the many lives at risk.8 Iowa Electric was
also distinguished because the strict regulation of the nuclear
power industry could point to a clear public policy barring rein-
statement of anyone caught breaking a safety rule. However, the
court reserved judgment as to whether the actual NRC regulations
involved in Iowa Electric would be sufficient to establish such a
policy.8 9 The court also noted that the NRC's explicit approval of
the machinist's discharge might be construed as a well defined ex-
pression of a public policy barring reinstatement. ° Delta Air
Lines, on the other hand, did not need to be distinguished because
it was inconsistent with the reading of the public policy exception
in Northwest Airlines v Air Line Pilots Association,9' where
agency action-FAA recertification of a pilot after alcohol rehabili-
tation-led the District of Columbia Circuit to uphold the pilot's
reinstatement.92
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wallace objected to Judge
Reinhardt's inference of amenability to discipline when the award
was silent on the issue. He reasoned that if amenability to disci-
pline can be found when an award is silent, then determination of
public policy is effectively given to the arbitrator in cases where
future conduct is involved. 3
Judge Reinhardt's analytical approach provoked a strong dis-
sent from Judge Trott, who focused on public health and safety
concerns and the institutional role of the court. The dissent ques-
tioned whether a court should stand by and allow lives to be en-
dangered and further questioned the rule of strict deference when
facts indicate that an employee is unrepentant and unlikely to re-
spond to discipline.9 4 Judge Trott criticized the narrow interpreta-
87 Stead Motors 11, 886 F2d at 1212-13 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
" Id at 1214.
', Id.
10 Id at 1214-15.
, 808 F2d 76 (DC Cir 1987).
92 Id at 83.
" Stead Motors H, 886 F2d at 1227 (Wallace concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"4 Id at 1224 (Trott dissenting).
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tion of the public policy exception as being "like a column of cor-
rect numbers added up improperly." 95
The dissent pointed out that the reinstated mechanic was any-
thing but repentant. He had been formally warned of his reckless-
ness in tightening lug nuts on a prior occasion.96 This warning ac-
cused the mechanic of "gross negligence.' '97 Less than a year later,
he once again argued with his superior about proper lug nut tight-
ening procedures. Subsequently, the mechanic's inattention to de-
tail caused seven out of ten nuts to loosen and one nut to fall off
when a customer drove home from the repair shop. The mechanic
insisted he could not have been responsible even though, according
to the work order, he was the only employee who had worked on
the car. 8
In the discussion section of the reinstatement award, the arbi-
trator observed:
Grievant knew the requirements of this particular job
function. He also knew of the potential danger to life and
safety and the potential consequences thereof to the Em-
ployer .... Grievant's failure to tighten the lug [nuts]...
constituted recklessness which warranted discipline ....
In addition, at the arbitration hearing, Grievant was
unduly argumentative and he attempted repeatedly to
justify and excuse his conduct. His behavior did not as-
sist his cause.9
Reinstatement of such an employee poses a distinct problem for a
federal court asked to enforce such an award. "No wonder the dis-
trict court refused to sanction this travesty," remarked Judge
Trott. "It would be one thing for the parties themselves to get to-
gether privately and agree on such an unpalatable result, but it is
another altogether for a federal court to put its imprimatur on
such a disaster."100
" Stead Motors 11, 886 F2d at 1217.
96 Id at 1218. The court quoted the arbitrator's warning:
After installing the left rear tire, you failed to properly tighten the lug [nuts]
which caused all but 2 of the [nuts] to fall off. The 2 remaining [nuts] came so
loose that the wheel almost came off while this owner was driving at highway
speeds in San Francisco.
o Stead Motors 11, 886 F2d at 1218.
Id at 1218-19.
Id at 1219.
100 Id.
6251
644 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
The dissent attacked the court's narrow view for "chok[ing]
the 'public policy' exception into oblivion."' 1 It suggested that
a broad rule, which would allow striking down an award that en-
dangers public safety, "gives life to the public policy exception
rather than suffocating it beyond resuscitation."' 0 2 Rejecting as
"bromidic" Judge Reinhardt's observation that "all of us suffer
when potentially productive workers are relegated to unemploy-
ment," the dissent insisted this "is scarcely a response to the
threat of public safety."'0 -3 The waste to the public of a reckless
worker being discharged does not balance with the peril to public
health and safety from reinstatement. Only a broad view would al-
low such a balancing test. Thus the dissent felt this case was
proper for application of the public policy exception:
Accidents happen in the blink of an eye. Danger appears
-out of nowhere, sinking ships, downing planes, and send-
ing cars out of control .... I do not believe that deference
to arbitration, a concept with which I wholeheartedly
agree, suffers at all if the judiciary retains the right to
keep arbitrators within the bounds of public policy; nor
do I think that Misco compels the excessively "hands-
off" policy adopted today in this circuit.'0 4
The crucial distinction between the court and the dissent in
Stead Motors II is one of timing. The court, reading Misco as al-
lowing an arbitrator to prescribe punishment or rehabilitation,
looks to public policy implications only after an award has been
given. The dissent, on the other hand, looks to the original act and
does not examine the specific award, but asks whether arbitration
should receive deference if public safety has been put at risk. The
problem with the dissent's view is that it implies that arbitration is
meaningless; presumably only final awards that matched the opin-
ion of the reviewing court would be affirmed. The implications of
this broad view go beyond the Trilogy, Grace and Misco by ques-
tioning whether, where health and safety are at risk, an arbitration
award should receive deference at all.
Stead Motors II, 886 F2d at 1221.
102 Id at 1222.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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IV. A PUBLIC SAFETY STANDARD OF REVIEW
The public safety applications of Misco present a dilemma.
The reckless employees in Iowa Electric, Delta Air Lines and
Stead Motors II hardly provoke sympathy. Each acted in manifest
disregard of public safety. Yet in none of these cases did an arbi-
trator find such egregious conduct sufficient for dismissal. Under a
narrow public policy exception, none of these awards may be ques-
tioned; any court doing so would just be substituting its view for
the arbitrator's. Only a broad reading of Misco allows judicial re-
view of reinstatements when public health and safety has been
placed at risk. Unfortunately, as argued above, the broad view mis-
applies the standard of review laid out in Misco and could lead to
the ultimate demise of arbitral finality in public safety cases.
In none of the cases above is there any conclusive evidence
that the reinstated employee had been rehabilitated or sufficiently
deterred from his or her reckless behavior. The pilot in Delta Air
Lines was treated for alcohol abuse, but the court cited no evi-
dence to support the arbitration board's finding that the alcohol
rehabilitation program had "effective results."' 0 5 The machinist in
Iowa Electric was reinstated because of the arbitrator's erroneous
determination that he did not know the seriousness of violating
nuclear containment.0 6 The auto mechanic in Stead Motors II
consistently acted with deliberate and willful obstinance to a rudi-
mentary safety measure: tightening a nut; even during grievance
proceedings, he was argumentative and unrepentant. 0 7
Although the Trilogy does not require that an arbitrator write
a clear opinion, 0 8 in each of these cases there was a written opin-
ion with facts that could support a reasonable finding by a review-
ing court that discharge would have been proper. Nevertheless,
under Misco a court is forbidden to make an inquiry into a rein-
statement award that does not directly violate public policy. The
arbitrator is given the sole power of deciding remedies, regardless
of whether these awards are silly, inadequate, or in serious error.109
One question that must be addressed is why a court should be
required to enforce an award that arguably increases the
probability of harm to the public. Certainly, the problem is not
speculative. Newspapers are filled with accounts of airplane
108 See Delta Air Lines, 861 F2d at 668.
1o Iowa Electric, 834 F2d at 1426.
107 Stead Motors 11, 886 F2d at 1219 (Trott dissenting).
100 See text accompanying notes 12-14.
109 See text accompanying notes 30-39.
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crashes and train wrecks that have been attributed to either em-
ployee recklessness or substance abuse. 1
A court should allow arbitration of public health and safety
issues, but should enforce only those reinstatement awards that are
supported by a detailed record providing evidence that future em-
ployee safety violations will be unlikely. When an arbitrator offers
inadequate written support for an award, it is proper for a court to
remand the case for subsequent factfinding. If, after remand, the
court still finds no consideration of public health and safety, then
the reinstatement should be overturned. This argument rests on
the premise that public safety interests outweigh the purposes of
strict arbitral finality; industrial peace need not be attained at the
price of innocent lives.
By giving undue deference to erroneous awards, Misco pro-
vides no workable standard to protect the public from an increased
risk of harm. Instead, courts should adopt an alternative public
safety standard of review: when an employee has been discharged
for conduct that has substantially put public health and safety at
risk, an arbitration award reinstating such an employee should be
upheld only when the evidence supports a finding that the em-
ployee will be unlikely to commit dangerous acts in the future. In
the case of employee recklessness, an award must show, at a mini-
mum, that the employee realized the severity of his or her act, re-
gretted its occurrence and will be responsive to the prescribed
sanction. Similarly, in the case of a substance abuser, an arbitrator
should evaluate an offered treatment program and hear evidence
on success rates. The arbitrator should also prescribe a monitoring
procedure, to ensure that the employee has been rehabilitated
prior to reinstatement, as well as periodic random testing.
This standard would ease strict deference to unsupported ar-
bitral determinations of an employee's amenability to discipline. It
is unreasonable to require a court to defer to an unsupported
award when the facts contradict finding that the employee in ques-
tion will act responsibly in the future. Recidivism is a key issue
here. Psychological and substance abuse problems are complex,
and an arbitrator's reinstatement should not be read as a magic
wand that cures the affliction. Unless an arbitrator is an expert in
drug rehabilitation, for instance, there could be danger in blindly
deferring to his or her uninformed opinion.
"' Even substance abuse without injury has been newsworthy. See, for example, Air-
line Fires Pilots Over Drinking Episode, Chicago Tribune 1-3 (Mar 17, 1990) (three North-
west Airlines pilots fired for having blood-alcohol levels exceeding federal regulations).
[1990:
REINSTATING DANGEROUS EMPLOYEES
The framework of this public safety standard of review draws
on Professor Gould's argument that judicial review in public policy
cases should be premised on evidence in a written arbitration
opinion:
[W]here predominant public policy considerations are in-
volved, the arbitrator, notwithstanding what the Court
said in Enterprise Wheel about the fact that arbitral
opinions are not required in the labor arena, should cite
chapter and verse with reference to the record as to the
potential for and actuality of rehabilitation, and the basis
for the arbitrator's conclusion that reinstatement is ap-
propriate under the circumstances.11'
When a record lacks factfinding, Gould proposes that an arbi-
tration award should be vacated, although he indicates that re-
mand might be appropriate in some circumstances." 2 Gould's rule
may be unjust, however, because it presumes that an employee is
dangerous until proven otherwise. Under such a rule, discharge
might be upheld in a case where an arbitrator's opinion omits the
fact that the employee has been successfully rehabilitated. While
such an unjust outcome may be possible, at least Gould's standard
errs on the side of safety.
Gould's proposal goes too far, however, by suggesting that
state legislatures mandate written opinions in all situations." 3
Gould argues that this should only be a slight burden because la-
bor and management already expect well-reasoned opinions. 1 4 Yet
Gould does not address the potential problem of federal preemp-
tion that might arise if a state enacted such a rule.
In contrast, the standard proposed by this Comment does not
require a sweeping change in the structure of state labor law and
does not risk federal preemption. Instead of requiring an opinion
by force of law, this standard simply provides a requirement of evi-
dentiary support for arbitrators who do not wish to be overturned.
Although a complete and detailed opinion would be most helpful
to a reviewing court, it should not be required. Rather than auto-
matically vacating an award because there is no written opinion, a
court need only examine the record to see if an award is ade-
... William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards-Thirty Years
of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 Notre Dame L Rev
464, 491-92 (1989).
lZ Id at 492 n 112.
,1 Id at 492-93.
... Id at 493.
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quately supported by evidence, thus avoiding the problem of un-
justly discharging a successfully rehabilitated employee. The cru-
cial determination in public safety reinstatements is whether an
employee has been sufficiently deterred or effectively rehabili-
tated-not whether an arbitrator, who need not be an attorney,
has written a legal opinion sufficient for court scrutiny.
To apply the public safety standard of review, a moving party
seeking to overturn an award must prove two assertions. First, the
party must show that the employee's conduct presented a serious
risk to the public. Second, the party must show that the arbitra-
tion award inadequately ensured "the potential for and actuality of
rehabilitation."'1 5 By making the endangerment of public safety
the threshold, the number of cases that would meet this standard
should be limited, making it narrower than the general public pol-
icy exception. Thus narrowed, the standard serves public interests
without unduly invading upon arbitral autonomy in other situa-
tions. General public policy concerns should still be resolved under
Misco, which balances public needs with the state interest in the
finality of labor arbitration. Only when lives are placed at risk
should the present system be set aside.
Although Congress declared an interest in labor arbitration in
section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA"),"16 it also stated in the LMRA declaration of policy that
"employers, employees, and labor organizations" should "above all
recognize under law that neither party has any right in its relations
with any other to engage in acts or practices that jeopardize the
public health, safety, or interest.11 7 Arbitration, when it is the
bargained-for method of contract interpretation, is an integral part
of the relationship between the parties. Thus, while parties may
allow an arbitrator to adjudicate public safety issues, any award
that does not protect public interests is not covered by the LMRA,
and hence subject to review by the courts.
Judicial review of safety awards does not conflict with the ra-
tionale of the Trilogy, which is premised upon the idea that an
expert arbitrator, knowledgeable in the "common law of the shop"
would be better able than a court to understand complex industrial
relations. Public safety is not an issue about which most arbitra-
tors have any special expertise; safety awards do not require the
same degree of deference as do plant-related issues. Nor would ju-
Gould, 64 Notre Dame L Rev at 492.
LMRA § 203(d), 29 USC § 173(d) (1982).
M LMRA § 1(b), 29 USC § 141(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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dicial review interfere with industrial peace. Few unions would in-
sist upon reinstating a demonstrably dangerous employee." l8
The public safety standard of review provides important in-
centives to employees, employers and arbitrators. First, it provides
an incentive to employees to take care that they do not endanger
the public. By knowing that he or she will not be protected by final
labor arbitration, an employee will seek to avoid reckless acts. Sec-
ond, because discharging potentially dangerous employees may re-
duce tort liability exposure, this standard provides employers with
added incentive to monitor employee activities. Often an employer
will be in the best position to detect employee recklessness through
either direct observation or information from supervisors and fel-
low employees. Under the present rule, an employer could be
forced to take back a reckless employee. This may be very costly,
unless the employee can be diverted to a less risky job. Third, this
standard gives arbitrators an incentive to require psychological in-
put prior to making crucial reinstatement decisions. For example,
if an employee who was discharged for using crack cocaine can be
shown by independent expert evaluation to be cured of her addic-
tion, then an arbitrator may reinstate that employee, subject to
subsequent monitoring. When such evidence is not available, how-
ever, an arbitrator will know that the award is likely to be over-
turned. An arbitrator who is frequently overruled will be less likely
to be hired; consequently, he or she will take more care in support-
ing reinstatement determinations.
One might reasonably expect this public safety standard of re-
view to be criticized on a number of grounds. First, it can be ar-
gued that such a rule puts a great burden on the arbitral process.
Expert witnesses and monitoring costs are expensive. However, in
spite of the difficulties in administering the rule, the burden to the
public from rehiring an employee who has a significant chance of
backsliding into substantially dangerous behavior clearly outweighs
the demand for arbitral simplicity. In the modern world, the stakes
are too high to validate an arbitrator's mere good faith belief that,
for example, a twenty-year history of alcoholism can be success-
fully treated in six months or a year. To minimize error, the in-
quiry cannot cease at the end of the grievance proceeding. Since
there is always a risk that the employee's misbehavior will con-
tinue, an arbitrator must provide for evaluation prior to reinstate-
"' For example, the Air Line Pilots Association stated it had "no tolerance whatsoever
toward drugs or alcohol in the cockpit." Airline Fires Pilots, Chicago Tribune 1-3 (cited in
note 110).
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ment and periodic evaluation thereafter. No other method can con-
tinually and adequately protect public interests.
Second, one of the primary concerns in proposing a standard
based on a malleable concept such as public policy or public safety
is that it will seriously undermine arbitral finality. Commentators
have criticized the public policy exception for setting forth a flex-
ible standard under which courts may substitute their opinions for
those of arbitrators.11 9 Judge Harry T. Edwards noted the strategic
advantages for an employer:
Even if an employer knows that a particular public policy
challenge is unwinnable, it can achieve substantial delay
in implementing an award if it knows that the courts are
generally solicitous of public policy claims. Arbitral final-
ity will thus be significantly reduced, and unions will
know that they will ultimately have to resort to strikes
and other forms of economic warfare to settle their griev-
ances. This would greatly disserve unions, employers and
the public at large. 120
The proposed standard of review affects only the limited num-
ber of grievances where an employee has substantially endangered
the public. An employer would waste time and money by challeng-
ing an arbitrator's reward where a sober employee drove a delivery
truck five miles over the speed limit on an open road. Although
such a driver would have violated the law, it is unlikely the public
would have been placed in significant peril. This type of case
would be inappropriate for public safety review; under such cir-
cumstances, an arbitrator's reinstatement award should receive ju-
dicial deference. On the other hand, if an intoxicated driver ran a
red light, the situation would provide a better case for an employer
to argue against arbitral reinstatement on public safety grounds.
A final criticism of public safety review might be based on
contract doctrine. If an employer can choose not to fire an em-
ployee who has violated public safety, should not an arbitrator be
allowed to make this same decision? A court cannot force an em-
ployer to discharge an employee for dangerous conduct; it can only
hold an employer liable should harm occur. One important distinc-
tion is that when an employer is liable in tort, it may internalize
decisions by voluntarily retaining employees who may cause harm.
The employer may weigh the costs and benefits of retaining the
"' See text accompanying notes 17-18.
,2 Edwards, 64 Chi Kent L Rev at 34 (cited in note 20) (footnotes omitted).
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employee, knowing that if harm should occur, it will be held liable.
On the other hand, when an employer is forced to retain a hazard-
ous employee as a result of arbitration, it loses control over its own
risk management.
CONCLUSION
In many modern industries a careless or substance-abusing
employee may endanger countless lives. Newspaper accounts of
airline crashes, oil spills and nuclear accidents bring this point
home. Although the Supreme Court held in Misco that no arbitra-
tion award that violates public policy may be enforced by a court,
at the same time the Court extended strict deference to erroneous,
perhaps even silly, arbitral remedies. Paradoxically, when an em-
ployee has endangered the public as a result of job-related psycho-
logical impairment or substance abuse, an erroneous determination
of the employee's potential for rehabilitation violates any policy
aimed at public health and safety. By placing rehabilitation solely
in the hands of an arbitrator, Misco,. as applied to public safety
cases, prevents a court from examining an arbitrator's reasons for
returning a potentially dangerous employee to work.
Courts seeking to vacate reinstatements that jeopardize public
safety have molded the public policy exception to make it apply in
particular cases. As an alternative, this Comment provides a prin-
cipled standard for a court seeking to review the arbitral reinstate-
ment of an employee who has been discharged for dangerous con-
duct. Reinstatement of such an employee should only be enforced
when supported by evidence of rehabilitation and accompanied by
a provision for future monitoring. The rule of strict deference may
place protection of the public solely in the hands of an arbitrator
hired by private parties for his or her expertise in industrial mat-
ters. Providing an exception to this rule when public safety is im-
plicated would lend a second level of scrutiny which would mini-
mize erroneous awards and, consequently, increase public health
and safety.
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